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# مجلة ميسان للادراسات الاكاديمية العلوم الانسانية والاجتماعية والتطبيقية

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المجلد (23) العدد (50) حزيران (2024)

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## African Development in the New Millennium: Going Beyond the "Good Governance" Debate

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### Abstract:

Africa is a rapidly changing continent. But for many, it is still an unknown place, shrouded by myths and distorted perceptions. Africa is in many ways still a marginalized continent. But things are certainly changing, and are going to change much more in the near future. This paper examines the debate surrounding the issue of 'good governance' and whether it is actually good for development. It offers a concise summary of literature and evidence in the three areas: the 'good governance' agenda as it has affected Africa, the research-based response to this, and the implications for Africa's economic transformation. Thus, the second section discusses the origins of the concern about governance quality in Africa between the 1970s and the 1990s; the third section reviews the rebuttals and reformulations that have led the scholarly debate since the turn of the millennium; the fourth section applies the findings to the challenge of moving Africa on from economic growth to economic transformation; and the fifth section concludes that comprehensive governance improvement is not necessarily a precondition for economic progress in developing Africa.

**Keywords:** Africa, Governance, Development, Economic Growth, Economic Transformation, Neopatrimonialism

### Introduction:

Kayima is a tiny, isolated village with 2,000 residents that is located in the extreme northeast of Sierra Leone, West Africa. It takes around three hours to get there via rough road from the closest metalled road. In 1974, one of the writers lived in Kayima for a year before returning in January 2014, forty years later. Almost everything remained the same, including the streets,

homes, and people. Everything looked to be locked in time, with the exception of a few burned-out houses on Main Street, which are a remnant of the Civil War, a new community bank, and a mobile phone mast. Mud brick houses with no electricity and water from a few standpipes outside were exactly as they had been in 1974. It appeared that not much had changed in forty years, at least in the instance of Kayima (Binns and Maconachie, 2005; Maconachie and Binns, 2007; Bateman et al., 2017). We must question, though, is the whole of Africa like Kayima? While there are surely a lot of Kayimas across the continent, there are also a lot of skyscrapers, growing cities, and villages that have clearly been improved. There is no doubt that speaking about Africa in the twenty-first century or the past—or even today—makes generalizations unsafe. The cultures, economics, and levels of development of the 54 nations exhibit remarkable diversity.

Readers of *The Economist* might not agree with the generalizations made about Africa during the previous 20 years. An article titled "Hopeless Africa" in the *Economist* at the beginning of 2000 began with a somber description of Freetown, the capital of Sierra Leone, in the midst of the country's ten-year civil war. The author went on to say that "Sierra Leone manifests all the worst characteristics" of the continent (The Economist, 2000: 6). An even more optimistic piece regarding the continent appeared in *The Economist* in 2011. Under the heading "Africa Rising," the piece discussed China's efforts to modernize infrastructure and boost the industrial sector, as well as thriving local markets, a boom in commodities, advancements in healthcare, and peaceful, democratic governance (The Economist, 2011: 3). Africa, both as a continent and as the totality of its sovereign states, is poised to lead the new patterns of growth for the foreseeable future. Africa has transformed from the land of pessimism to the land of opportunity, according to Pascal Lamy, Director-General of the World Trade Organization, in a speech at the University of Nairobi, Kenya, in May 2013 (Lamy, 2022: 1).

Is development aided by good governance? A few years ago, the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs sponsored a thought-provoking collection of research studies titled "This Provocative Question" (Sundaram and Chowdhury, 2012). It was a really wise decision. It prompted scholars and activists devoted to traditional public sector reform and capacity-building initiatives in developing nations to reevaluate their presumptions with its pun on the term "good." It rightly acknowledged the reality that many aspects about the role of government, and more broadly, patterns of governance, in the economic and social development of impoverished nations are still unclear or controversial by framing the question rather than offering a solution.

Naturally, the subject of governance for development is not limited to Africa; in fact, discussion around it has gained more traction there than it has anywhere else in the developing world, particularly in the sub-Saharan area, which is our primary focus here. This makes Sundaram and Chowdhury's (2012) challenge extremely relevant to the issues raised in this guide. Their query and the variety of responses it has generated offer a useful foundation for examining the literature on African governance published, studied, and discussed throughout the last 50 years.

Over half of those fifty years have seen the use of the term "good governance." It is still a popular abbreviation among African thought leaders, pundits, and members of civil society, as well as in the hallways of international development organizations. It has a common core, even if many individuals

interpret it differently. Some elements of Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) number 16 of the UN (which states: "Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all, and build effective, accountable, and inclusive institutions at all levels") could be considered to encapsulate the essence. In accordance with UN (2015), sub-goals 16.5 to 16.7 bind the international community to significantly reduce bribery and corruption in all of its manifestations as well as to create "effective, accountable, and transparent institutions at all levels" and "responsive, inclusive, participatory, and representative decision-making" at all levels.

There is no denying the attractiveness of such widely expressed goals. They go hand in hand with about eight additional sub-goals that are unquestionably important and address a variety of violent abuses, crimes, and injustices that occur globally and need immediate national and international action. Sub-goals 16.5-16.7, however, are not as useful as they would seem; as action guides, they perform badly.

The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) at best conceal a large number of unsolved difficulties and controversies concerning the link between forms of government and development results in the actual world by presenting a list of somewhat abstract governance attributes as self-evidently and universally desirable. Controversially, they claim that a government system may be deemed good based on a single, simple set of characteristics. In the worst case scenario, they encourage the thoughtless application of concepts related to "best practice" governance without taking practicality and context into account.

When viewed in this light, the good governance agenda has consistently influenced perspectives on African development, primarily in situations that are action- and policy-oriented. On the other hand, scholarly study and research have made it their mission to scrutinize the presumptions that underlie these apparently straightforward statements of purpose. Scholars have consistently emphasized the necessity to differentiate between goals and methods, between value judgments and verifiable claims on causal relationships, and between the interests of the privileged and those of the underprivileged. The collective output of this body of work has been a more comprehensive understanding of what counts in the governance of development, one that is based on shared ideals, historical experience, and empirical data.

The fact that we now have this strong scientific foundation is crucial. It implies that we can respond to more detailed and focused inquiries on the sort of governance that distinct nations require. A key point has lately been reached in the economic and social development of several sub-Saharan African nations. Regular yearly growth in the gross domestic product and steady progress in important social metrics have become the norm. Civil wars and other forms of warfare are significantly less common than they formerly were. These shifts and realignments in the global economy, particularly in China, present significant chances to convert these gains into processes of economic transformation, whereby widespread advances in productivity and competitiveness serve as the foundation for economic development. However, whether or not these opportunities will be taken will depend greatly on what governments are willing and able to do.

The "good governance" agenda as it has influenced Africa, the research-based response to this, and the consequences for Africa's economic transformation are three areas that this paper briefly summarizes the literature and data on. Thus, the second section discusses the origins of the concern about governance quality in Africa between the 1970s and the 1990s; the third section reviews the rebuttals and

reformulations that have led the scholarly debate since the turn of the millennium; the fourth section applies the findings to the challenge of moving Africa on from economic growth to economic transformation; and the fifth section concludes.

### **(Not) Understanding African Governance:**

Africa is not a nation, and drawing broad conclusions about the continent is fraught with peril. However, it is preferable to understand a country's unique characteristics within the framework of some overarching patterns or cycles of change that have significantly impacted almost every one of them. The majority of nations were, at the most basic and broad level, either under Portuguese rule until the 1970s or a member of the British or French colonial empires until the 1960s. The majority of the now independent states gave up on their original multiparty constitutions between the 1960s and the 1980s, either adopting single-party systems or coming under military administration. In the 1990s, pro-democratization movements gained traction once more. Formally liberal-democratic constitutions are the norm in the area today, with political practices ranging from flawed democracy to covert authoritarianism (Crawford and Lynch, 2012; Cheeseman, 2015).

Over the same time span, the average sub-Saharan African nation's economic performance likewise showed notable ups and downs. According to Jerven's (2013) and (2015) figures, national and per capita income growth was noteworthy in some nations during the initial ten years after independence. However, this development abruptly decreased by the end of the 1970s and ultimately collapsed in the 1980s. The 1990s saw a recovery in economies. This occurred gradually at first, but since the middle of that decade, consistent rates of economic development that are rather quick yet unevenly dispersed have been the norm.

### **Does Governance Matter?**

There are no clear or simple links between observable developments in formal political governance and economic success at this broad level of analysis. This is not surprising given the general research evidence (Acemoglu et al., 2014; Kelsall, 2014; Masaki and van de Walle, 2014) that suggests a long-term benefit once democracy is consolidated but is otherwise inconclusive regarding the relationship between variables such as the quality of democracy and economic development. The evidence becomes more evident when the concept of quality governance is oriented toward the proximate drivers of development outcomes, such as impartiality and minimal corruption in public administration (Rothstein, 2011; Rothstein and Tannenber, 2015). However, this finding leaves unsettled what are the likely political drivers of this sort of quality.

Despite the rationale behind delaying judgment on the primary concerns, the prevailing viewpoint on African governance since the early 1990s has been anything from circumspect. One of the main arguments made for independent Africa has been that its poor overall governance is the reason for its uneven and sporadic economic and social progress. This has been interpreted broadly to suggest that the countries in the area should more fully adopt the political structures and policies used by the nations that have had the most success in elevating their citizens' standard of living and degree of national power. They just require better governance, and we already know exactly what it entails since it is demonstrated in cities like Stockholm, London, and Ottawa.



This viewpoint emerged during a specific historical juncture for both Africa and the global community, when a straightforward interpretation of the situation appeared consistent with the salient details. Around 1989, a number of important events and contributing elements came together at that time to lead many rational people to the same conclusions. African economies, or more precisely their formal sectors, which are the parts whose state is assessed, had reached a low point and were, at most, only just beginning to recover. The World Bank and IMF-funded structural adjustment and economic stabilization programs were becoming more and more influential in shaping national policy, and those at the forefront of this movement realized that stronger institutions would be necessary for economic recovery in addition to sound policies (World Bank, 1989). The world was starting to take notice of the new institutional economics, which maintained that markets could only operate effectively when they were underpinned by strong institutions (North, 1990). Meanwhile, past obstacles to Western governments' backing of democratic politics as the cornerstone of rational institution-building were swiftly removed with the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. Concurrently, a growing number of African urban dwellers subject to oppressive autocratic governments saw these international happenings as a sign of potential for a second liberation. Even in nations like Tanzania, where a type of single-party administration was still wildly popular in rural regions, multipartyism became the norm.

#### **Consolidation of an Orthodoxy:**

In this way, a broad coalition of Western lenders and donors, on the one hand, and African democrats and reformers, on the other, came together to forge an initially unassailable agreement. The notion of good governance was established to provide unity to the many components of the agreement. It developed to include everything from efficient civil service operations and good macroeconomic management to civic rights and widespread social engagement, including the creation and oversight of economic adjustment programs. The underlying thread running through all of these domains was that common issues had clear, experience-based answers.

In conclusion, almost everyone came to agree that: (a) Africa was failing to grow because it lacked strong institutions of government; and (b) this would not change until it did. It was implicitly assumed that good institutions were those that had recently been adopted in Japan and the developed West, namely liberal-democratic constitutions with accompanying mechanisms for preventing corruption, allowing open decision-making, and creating citizen accountability. The bundle of remedies quickly embraced the newest concepts in Western fashion, such as privatization, "unbundling" of public sector tasks, and the establishment of somewhat independent executive agencies to increase civil service efficiency (Bangura and Larbi, 2006).

The World Bank's initiatives, which provided concessional loans in exchange for "second generation" reforms that prioritized institutions over policies, were among the first examples of the new consensus in action (World Bank, 1994). In addition to the increasing frequency of competitive elections, the innovations included a variety of formal arrangements that represent contemporary ideas of best practices in public administration. These included electoral commissions, citizen monitoring committees, public defenders, anti-corruption watchdogs, civil service performance enhancement programs, medium-term expenditure frameworks, and participatory planning systems.

The extremely inconsistent outcomes of these innovations for a long while (Carothers, 1999, 2006; Andrews, 2013) did little to dampen the fervor with which they were pursued. Donors and governments were usually criticized for wanting more of the same, or for exerting more effort to improve the effectiveness of the solution. The average passenger on Nairobi's or Lagos's urban transportation system needs appropriate application of good governance principles, period. On the other hand, experts who temper their assessments of values with historical data and methodical investigation adopt an alternative stance.

### **Releasing the Historical Spirit:**

The agreement on effective governance in Africa makes perfect sense on one level. African economies and social interactions are comparatively in the early stages of capitalist development when compared to the entirety of human history. From a historical standpoint, it would be unexpected if their political structures lacked elements of the kind connected to pre-capitalism in other regions of the world. But just which kind? The first generation of political scientists researching independent Africa was concerned with this issue, and many of them read Max Weber's publications (1978 [1922]).

Weber made a distinction between modern democratic/bureaucratic, patrimonial, and feudal forms of political power. Many Africanists choose to support the notion that modern and patrimonial aspects coexist in contemporary Africa (Eisenstadt, 1972; Médard, 1982). Especially when compared to the feudalism of pre-modern Europe and Japan, patrimonial power is characterized by its centralization of authority and its blurring of the lines separating the ruler's personal home from the state's riches. Neopatrimonialism is the word used to describe a hybrid style of power that combines features of modern democratic/bureaucratic governance with significant patrimonial components.

### **The Concept of Neopatrimonialism:**

Neopatrimonialism, like pure patrimonialism, has undoubtedly historically proven detrimental to capitalism and economic advancement. Centralization and the use of public funds for the private enrichment of rulers and their families—what is now referred to as grand corruption—oppose the conditions that encourage private investment, particularly the kinds of private investment that support additional investment by funding infrastructure, for example, and those that generate large amounts of employment. This group of political scientists (Hyden, 1983; Callaghy, 1984; Joseph, 1987; Chabal, 1992) produced a wealth of examples showing how the control orientation and looting of public resources by the regimes they labeled neopatrimonial caused harm to African economic growth. Subsequently, van de Walle (2001) demonstrated how the 1980s and 1990s economic recovery attempts were hampered and skewed by neopatrimonial forces shaping policy. The idea that it is challenging to maintain economic progress, and particularly true economic transformation, under neopatrimonial regimes and "limited access orders" (North et al., 2009, 2013) more broadly is supported by a large body of more recent research and theory.

The political science consensus surrounding the thesis of neopatrimonialism circa 1989 did give the general good governance perspective some academic credibility. Those who have doubts about the latter have frequently focused their criticism on the former, in part because of this. Others accused the political scientists of misinterpreting Weber, while some critics wrongly said that the theory suggests

that the barriers to African development are associated with unique and unpleasant aspects of African culture (Therkildsen, 2005; Pitcher et al., 2009). They were in agreement with a third group that thought the idea was helpful in pointing out some general similarities but incorrect in hiding the fairly significant variations in the shapes that neopatrimonial leadership adopted in various nations and eras, with varying consequences for potential economic advancement (Kelsall, 2013; Mkandawire, 2015).

#### **Africa Viewed Through a Comparative Lens:**

When compared to the stances adopted by scholars and students of comparative development during the previous 25 years, the differences between regimes that share certain fundamental aspects of neopatrimonial administration become intriguing. There are five arguments that are important:

- Even if Africa's subpar development performance is linked to inadequate governance originating from neopatrimonial institutions, there is no solid reason to search for solutions in the institutional best practice ideologies that have surfaced in the world's wealthiest nations in recent decades. Should the experience of the developed world hold any significance, it would be prudent to examine their past, extending back to the days of absolute monarchy, when European administration was distinctly patrimonial. If not, we could be culpable for what Chang (2002) dubbed "kicking away the ladder," which is to say, depriving today's emerging nations the institutional frameworks and policy tools that allowed them to break free from their feudal or patrimonial pasts.
- It might be argued that the relatively recent development accomplishments of China, East Asian nations, and portions of South East Asia are a far more relevant source of inspiration when considering the connection between economic performance and governance. When considered collectively, such experiences do not point to a single general recipe or kind of political system that produces effective development results. There has been a great deal of diversity in these regimes. Around 1960, the South East Asian nations that most closely resembled sub-Saharan African nations had governance structures that were very comparable to those seen in Africa both then and now. Nevertheless, they have performed remarkably well economically. The causes must not be related to the type of regime (Henley, 2015).
- There is barely any dispute these days that, generally speaking, a country's acquired institutions play a vital role in determining what may be expected in terms of development performance. Nonetheless, this research-based agreement has two significant and related caveats.
- The first is that without certain fundamental institutional functions are carried out in some way, capitalism growth will not materialize; yet, the manner in which these tasks are carried out is neither universal or predetermined (Chang, 2007; Rodrik, 2007). To give simply the most notable positive example, without the specific form of well-defined property rights and contract law, China has been able to provide private actors with the confidence to invest over the previous few decades, although with remarkably beneficial results. Perhaps the most glaring example of a failure to satisfy the requirements for dynamic capitalist growth is Uganda, which is said to have the most comprehensive system of transparency and anti-corruption institutions globally (Andrews and Bategeka, 2013).
- The second, related observation regarding institutions is that, in various contexts where the underlying configurations of political and economic power (what some refer to as the "political settlement") differ,

seemingly identical institutional arrangements function very differently. This argument has also been made time and time again by political scientist Robert Bates, and it is currently mostly attributed to the economist Mushtaq Khan (1995, 2010).

Bates gained notoriety with a book that was influenced by the public choice movement (Bates, 1981). This clarified why it may make political sense for African governments to use pricing, tax, and exchange rate policies to collect "rents" from their agricultural sectors, then reinvest at least part of these funds in the form of subsidies into the rural areas. In contrast to the straightforward solution of offering favorable general circumstances for rural development, the book argued that the discretionary allocation for subsidies was a more successful means of establishing and preserving a political base in the countryside.

In many locations, state-run marketing boards remain one of the main tools used in this politically motivated suppression of African agricultural potential. However, during his research for his second book, Bates traveled to Kenya and discovered that, while Jomo Kenyatta was president, Kenyan marketing boards supported smallholder farmers very well; however, under Daniel arap Moi, they stopped doing so (Bates, 1989). The power brokers overseeing the boards' operations and their links with Kenya's principal ethnic and political constituencies were the key causes of the reasons (Bates, 2014).

#### **Multiple Paths:**

Therefore, if we understand comparative history correctly, it becomes evident that there are ways to escape neopatrimonial underdevelopment other than adopting the kinds of government that are currently ideologically preferred in the wealthier regions of the world from an early age. First off, as Henley (2015) points out, having a strong institutional structure may not be as crucial as having the correct policies. Second, the definition of a strong institutional framework varies depending on the circumstances and is heavily impacted by the distribution of political and economic power. Ultimately, considering all of this, we need to consider various avenues for development accomplishment, somewhere pertinent advancements in governmental patterns are quite constant and others where they are not (Levy, 2014). Success in either case is likely to involve a considerable measure of learning by trial and error (Rodrik, 2007).

#### **Contemporary Governance and Economic Transition:**

In recent decades, rapid economic expansion in Africa has become the norm, and focus has switched to the growth's structure and quality. Concerns include how the GDP has increased overall and in relation to different sectors and socioeconomic groups, how growth has seldom had a significant effect on poverty, and how poorly the most dynamic industries have been able to generate jobs. These problems stem from the fact that, within an economic framework that hasn't altered much since colonial times, a large portion of recent expansion has been driven by high commodity prices. Other than minerals, urbanization and services for the emerging middle and upper classes have been the main drivers of recent growth. With few exceptions, though, there have not been any appreciable increases in either the productivity of manufacturing or agriculture that creates jobs.

### **From Growing to Transforming Economies:**

Saying that nations are experiencing economic growth but not economic transformation or "growth with depth" is one way to put this (ACET, 2014). The process of shifting labor and other production inputs from lower- to higher-productivity activities, either within or between sectors, is referred to as economic transformation in this context (McMillan et al., 2016). Although there are still good reasons to focus on productivity increases in agriculture, particularly in the early phases of development (Breisinger and Diao, 2008), investment in manufacturing has seen the fastest rate of convergence in labor productivity between richer and poorer nations (Cimoli et al., 2009; Rodrik, 2013; Whitfield et al., 2015). Therefore, the deficit of attention to both agricultural productivity and manufacturing employment is a particularly troubling feature of the political economy of sub-Saharan Africa today.

Many would have viewed this as a challenge too great until recently, claiming that African nations could not be expected to take on the responsibilities of a "developmental state" since they had not done enough to strengthen their administration. There are two groups of reasons to be more upbeat, though. The first is related to shifts in the global economy, particularly in China. The potential for African expansion along conventional lines has been undermined by the slowdown of Chinese economic growth, which has already resulted in a decrease in demand for Africa's main commodities, particularly minerals. Positively, as Chinese wage increases force Chinese businesses to relocate the more labor-intensive portions of global value chains to other areas of the world, the current moment is offering a window of opportunity for African manufacturing (Lin, 2013; Stiglitz and Lin, 2013).

### **Learning from Asia:**

The third section's list of several critiques of the traditional viewpoint on African governance issues provides additional justification for our cautious optimism. Referring back to the experience of prosperous Asian nations, two points stand out as very pertinent. First, the nations that had the quickest changes in the industrial sector and/or in agriculture were not at all originally democracies. In their first stages of operation, they were deficient in several attributes linked to "sound governance." However, they did gain from a political leadership that viewed economic reform as a project for the betterment of the country and advocated for inclusive growth. Their regimes, with a few notable exceptions, established highly complex mechanisms to guarantee responsibility and foster agreement. Some of the most important aspects of Asian development models are not adequately represented by the traditional dichotomy between democracy and authoritarianism (MacIntyre, 1994; Campos and Root, 1996; Woo-Cumings, 1999).

Second, the example from Asia demonstrates that state bureaucracy does not have to become a powerful policy coordinator or a catalyst for private sector investment and productivity growth. The majority of success stories begin with a single politically empowered governmental agency in one industry. Johnson's (1982) investigation of Japan's Ministry of Trade and Investment focused on this issue. It is related to the tale of Indonesia's agricultural revolution aimed at eradicating poverty (Henley, 2015).

Building on this, Ansu *et al.* (2016) distinguish four requirements that appear universally relevant to effective policy for economic transformation:

- Bringing important players together to forge an agreement that positions economic transformation as a national development initiative with shared responsibilities that go long beyond a single term in office.
- Granting enough political authority, financial authority, and autonomy to at least one public agency so that it may overcome issues with interdepartmental coordination and work constructively with reputable private sector organizations.
- Putting in place institutional frameworks that can effectively coordinate a sizable number of influential public and private actors in order to guarantee that: (1) promising industries or businesses receive a sufficient amount of technically justified public support; and (2) this support is subject to mutually enforceable performance standards.
- Facilitating the identification of transformational strategies that are effective in the specific national context by clear testing, constructive criticism, and prompt correction.

### **Getting Practical:**

These sorts of agreements have been adopted by numerous Asian and a few Latin American nations, but examples of their adoption in sub-Saharan Africa are extremely rare. The main recorded exceptions are a small number of highly favored agricultural subsectors (dairy in Uganda, cocoa in Ghana, etc.) (Whitfield et al., 2015). Thus, in addition to assessing the technical appropriateness and efficacy of economic transformation strategies, it is crucial to consider their institutional design and political viability. There are two general concepts that appear to be true.

First and foremost, plans for reform and change must be modest in scope and politically astute in their pursuit, taking into consideration the motivations and interests of various economic players. Politically astute advocates can successfully implement regulatory reforms that enhance the long-term conditions for economic transformation even in politically unfavorable environments if they are adept at navigating the political-economic roadblocks and picking up knowledge along the way, as demonstrated by the experiences of nations like Nigeria, Nepal, and the Philippines (Booth, 2014, 2016).

Second, policy objectives and early investment selections should include the ability to influence the political economy and opinion through demonstrative effects, in addition to the case's economic benefits. As in other places, entrenched interests and antiquated economic theories frequently act as roadblocks to effective institutions and strategies for economic development in Africa (Rodrik, 2014; te Velde et al., 2016). Initiatives created expressly to outline the parameters of an economic transformation agenda might be helpful in these situations. This means focusing on one or two promising industries where it will be possible to demonstrate the financial advantages and potential profitability of new, high-productivity endeavors in a way that will make arguments raised only on the basis of intellectual curiosity seem less compelling. It thus becomes simpler to address the entrenched interests.

### **Conclusion:**

Combined, these arguments have an obvious major meaning. Too long have perspectives whose starting point is a comparison of the current state of African countries with that of capitalist liberal

democracies (rather than where they used to be when their economic and social structures were more akin to those of Africa today) shaped the priorities for African governance. The lessons learned from Asia's multiple rounds of economic advancement have received much too little attention. Given this, the messages on the significance of "good governance" that emerged and gained traction in the 1980s and 1990s are, at most, deceptive. It is regrettable that the UN statement on the SDGs still echoes them, although in a rather abstract manner. In developing Africa, economic advancement does not always need comprehensive improvements in governance. Based on lessons learned elsewhere, the key criteria include politically astute initiatives that are directed towards particular transformational hurdles and are complemented by quick feedback and correction. These ought to be the cornerstones of any future discourse on African governance for development.

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