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المجلد (23) العدد (50) حزيران (2024)

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

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Environmental Foreign Policy and Diplomacy in an Unequal World

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Abstract:

This paper examines the intersections between various governmental tiers by concentrating on foreign policy and diplomatic players. It starts by outlining environmental foreign policy and the two primary methods used to characterize, evaluate, and clarify how it functions on many levels. This paper examines how the politics of foreign policy are evolving in light of the increasing complexity of the international system, after analyzing these two approaches. It highlights a number of foreign policy difficulties that arise when local and international concerns converge. Not unexpectedly, diplomacy is a major issue in international environmental politics and is also covered in this paper. It highlights how outcomes may be significantly influenced by the negotiating procedures that diplomats engage in, whether they are at official international conferences or private bilateral encounters. This present research provides an overview of the main themes covered in the field of environmental diplomacy, including game theory, leadership, domestic and international relations, issue linkage, non-state actors' impact, norms and language, and negotiation and argumentation techniques. It makes the case that environmental diplomacy has lost credibility in recent years due to recurrent failures to draft a climate pact. The discussion of implications for future study on environmental foreign policy and diplomacy closes this work. It also emphasizes the necessity to reevaluate the function of diplomacy in government and the definition of the "outcome" of negotiations.

Keywords: Environmental Foreign Policy, Environmental Diplomacy, International System, Environmental Problems, Global Environmental Politics, Negotiation

Introduction:

In a seminal essay published in 1988, Robert Putnam used the phrase "two-level games" to characterize the way in which public servants carry out diplomacy and foreign policy by concurrently participating in national and international debates. Since then, the idea that foreign policy decision-makers serve as middlemen between domestic and foreign (or

international) borders has gained momentum in academic circles. It has increased the opportunities for academics to examine the connections between foreign policy analysis and international relations. These levels are composed of several layers, as studies that examined the domestic and international levels in greater depth subsequently found (Ajala 2010; Piattoni 2010; Woolcock 2011; Cottier and Hertig 2013; Okon 2018). Numerous governmental (national and subnational) and nonprofit actors engage with one another on a domestic level. Globally, negotiations occur at several levels, including bilateral, regional, and international ones (Babatunde 2015; Adekoya and Nnoli 2017: 236). These performers not only perform on many levels concurrently, but they also utilize one to affect the other (s).

Because of the growing complexity of global politics—the rise in players, topics, and cooperation arrangements—environmental foreign policy and diplomacy officials find themselves at the intersection of several negotiation processes. It also broadens the idea that foreign policy officials work as middlemen, leading to a great deal of uncertainty regarding their responsibilities, choices, and effects. These uncertainties still exist in the literature; research on foreign policy often arises apart from research on the intricacies of governance.

One significant development in contemporary international relations is the emergence of environmental diplomacy. In recent decades, negotiations on environmental issues have resulted in over 700 multilateral policy agreements and over 1,000 bilateral agreements (Chizea 2011: 113; Mitchell 2013). Government representatives from all around the globe convene for global environmental meetings at any time, usually in Geneva, New York, Bonn, Bangkok, or New Delhi, among other regular diplomatic sites. There were twenty rounds of official discussions on climate change alone between 2007 and the end of 2015. "Regime saturation" and "negotiating weariness" are lamented by government authorities. An average of 115 days were spent annually between 1992 and 2007 on important conferences concerning eleven of the current international environmental accords (Muoz et al. 2019; Ahmed and Osagie 2021: 326). An atmosphere where environmental policy is continuously being negotiated becomes evident when we take into account other environmental issues and the numerous pre-negotiation meetings and technical workshops.

Since negotiations are the main method of creating international institutions, environmental diplomacy is crucial from an academic perspective (Hasenclever et al. 1997; Young 1998; Haas et al. 1993; Levy et al. 1995; Goldstein et al. 2000; Chasek 2015; Dada 2016). "A process of mutual persuasion and modification of interests and policies aimed at bringing together non-identical actor preferences into a single shared decision" is the definition of negotiation given by Rittberger (1998). The process is broken down into distinct analytical phases. Various political factors influence the pre-negotiation, negotiation, and implementation of international agreements, according to Oran Young (1994). Years of official and informal talks on a treaty's guidelines, such as its goals, schedules, methods of implementation, and compliance processes, usually make up negotiations.

This present research examines the many issues and processes that are at the heart of the discourse around environmental foreign policy and diplomacy. With the increasing pressures of environmental degradation, the growing recognition of human dependence on ecosystems, and the need to understand

the evolving role of foreign policy as a critical mechanism of political agency in global environmental politics, environmental foreign policy-making is an especially relevant topic. This paper's first portion introduces environmental foreign policy and discusses the two main methods utilized to describe, analyze, and make sense of its numerous facets. An analytical approach that is state-centered comes first. It demonstrates how individuals in charge of environmental foreign policy view the state as the main source of political power and try to employ varying degrees of collaboration. Common capacities are where the second model, which focuses on multilevel governance, starts. Though they are not necessarily the most influential, foreign policy officials who deal with environmental concerns are one group of players that take on policy obligations in this sector. After examining these two approaches, this paper looks at how foreign policy politics are changing in response to the growing complexity of the international system. It lists several barriers to foreign policy at the nexus of the national and international, such as identifying environmental issues, planning institutional choices, addressing transnational civil society, and responding to questions about equity brought up by the system's growth.

This paper also looks at diplomacy, which is a significant issue in global environmental politics, which is not surprising. It emphasizes that results may be greatly influenced by diplomatic talks, whether they take place in secretive meetings or at formal international conferences. Game theory, leadership, domestic–international interactions, problem linkage, the effect of non-state actors, norms and rhetoric, and argumentation and bargaining strategies are the main issues of this paper on environmental foreign policy and diplomacy. The current spate of attempts to establish a climate change accord has damaged environmental diplomacy. Environmental talks have the power to change attitudes and bring about changes in green policies even in the absence of official agreements. The importance of this research for further studies on environmental foreign policy and diplomacy is covered in this paper's last part. It also highlights how crucial it is to reconsider how diplomacy fits into the government process and what constitutes a successful negotiation "outcome."

Theoretical Debates on Environmental Foreign Policy and Multiple Levels of Governance:

Environmental foreign policy is the term used to describe state efforts to protect, conserve, and improve the environment outside of state borders (Papa 2019: 220–221; Harris 2020, 2021; Folami, Idowu, and Ahmed 2021: 454–456). When it comes to the environment, the state is a construct since environmental challenges transcend political boundaries. Historically, the state has been linked to the consolidation of power in politics, with foreign policy officials serving as the exclusive bridgeheads between the national and international spheres. As corporations, international organizations, and a growing range of citizen groups gained greater influence over policy (Adekson 2016; Okonkwo 2019; Okunfolami 2020), and as different government departments became more active and involved in international affairs, it became evident that the nature of state authority was changing (Matthews 1997; Slaughter 1997; Nwolise 2020). To include these dynamic tendencies in governing systems and the variety of parties involved at both the national and international levels, the word "governance" was developed.

The term "governance" describes novel approaches to accomplishing societal goals in which states take part and may, but are not required to, take the lead (Rhodes 1996; Stoker 1998; Rosenau and

Czempiel 1992). Environmental governance is the term used by researchers to describe these goals when they have to do with managing environmental difficulties or resolving environmental disputes through the creation, modification, or reaffirmation of institutional structures (Davidson and Frickel 2014; Paavola 2017; Bukarambe 2019). This section first looks at how foreign policy officials cooperate at different levels from a state-centric standpoint. It presents the idea of multilevel governance, which begins to analyze environmental foreign policy by utilizing the shared competencies of foreign policy officials and other players.

Policy Engagement at Multiple Levels: States as Points of Departure:

Governments aim to use the varied degrees of cooperation in environmental diplomacy in a variety of ways, and they determine that some approaches are more suited for particular concerns than others. Governments must first decide whether to cooperate and, if they do, whether to pursue institutional collaboration or just one-time cooperation. For instance, they might select from a variety of possibilities for collaboration:

Unilateralism. One state acting alone or on one side is considered a unilateral action. They serve as a means of demonstrating a commitment to a policy. An example of this may be seen in Russia's 1893 attempt to save the fur seal species from going extinct. In response to British and North American fishing in the region, Russia issued an edict forbidding the capture of fur seals just outside its territorial seas. In situations when effective multilateral collaboration is not feasible, unilateral actions can also be utilized to lead policy changes in multilateral forums (Bodansky 2020: 172; Onyekwere 2021). Parties to the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species, for example, are allowed to unilaterally impose restrictions on wildlife trade that may be significantly stricter than those imposed by the Convention, due to their own concerns about contributing to the decline of species that are consumed within their borders (Chinwetalu 2018: 251). A critical mass of governments adopting unilateral acts increases the likelihood of a multilateral response.

Bilateralism. Two governments work together to take on bilateral initiatives. This type of collaboration is frequently used by environmental foreign policy authorities to manage shared resources with their neighbors; for instance, they sign treaties on cooperative river development (e.g., Dinar et al. 2011; Baoku 2016). Environmental cooperation may be a means to strengthen ties between adjacent nations that may not have similar interests or concerns because of a shared aversion to environmental problems (Ali 2017; Kolawole 2020). For instance, the Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park, Southern Africa's first peace park, was established in 1999 as a result of a historic bilateral pact signed by Botswana and a newly democratic South Africa. Since there are no actual physical borders between the two national parks and animals are free to roam around, the countries committed to managing their parks as a unified biological unit. Agreements on environmental aid or cooperative development of renewable energy technology are two examples of the kinds of bilateral environmental cooperation that take place between non-neighboring governments.

Regionalism. By participating into issue-specific regional accords or creating environmental components of larger regional integration processes, environmental foreign policy and diplomacy authorities participate in regional cooperation. For example, regional collaboration is required to ensure

that countries that produce the problem and those who are impacted by it collaborate to find solutions because acid rain is a transboundary issue in Europe (see Bamidele 2019). The United Nations Economic Commission for Europe's secretariat oversaw the 1979 enactment of the Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Pollution. Regional integration processes can also be significantly influenced by the environment. Regulations were more standardized and regional norms spread as a result of nations having to match their environmental policies with EU standards in order to join the EU (see Diamond and Falola 2020: 365). Participants in other regional agreements and coalitions, such the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the North American Free Trade Agreement, have also demonstrated environmental cooperation.

Multilateralism. When several nations must be involved, foreign policy experts take use of multilateral collaboration. Climate change and other environmental issues have an international reach because greenhouse gas emissions from anywhere in the globe raise the average global temperature, which poses diverse but significant hazards to every nation (Aina 2016). Thus, multilateralism is important for managing the issue as well as comprehending its nature. More broadly, environmental diplomacy has often involved extensive multilateralism involving over 170 nations. It has been utilized to draft agreements on anything from transboundary chemical transport (Atilola and Usman 2018) to national rights and obligations for the use of the world's seas (Ahmed 2019). Both the 2012 "Rio+20" UN Conference on Sustainable Development and the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro brought together over 200 nations to plan the course and means of enacting the global shift toward sustainability. These UN-hosted mega-conferences on environment and development are among the biggest political gatherings in the world (Okunjemiruwa 2020: 178).

Every nation's diplomats and environmental foreign policy officers work on a wide range of issues concurrently at various levels. Depending on where the cooperation process is in, they may employ various combinations of unilateralism, bilateralism, regionalism, and multilateralism. However, a state's foreign policy may always be seen of as a portfolio of measures taken at various levels with the goal of achieving the state's desired foreign policy objectives (Palmer and Morgan 2006). States have drafted numerous environmental agreements over the years. There are 1,520 bilateral and 1,131 multilateral environmental agreements, as well as 197 bilateral and 211 multilateral non-binding documents, such as declarations and memoranda of understanding, according to the International Environmental Agreements Database (Mitchell 2012; Nwafor 2018). The foreign policy portfolios and endeavors of states have grown in tandem at various levels.

What justifies the engagement of governments in multilevel environmental cooperation? International relations theory draws upon three theoretical frameworks to explain the genesis and sustainability of international cooperation: power-based theories, interest-based theories, and knowledge-based theories (Hasenclever et al. 1997; Barrett 2013; Nwafor 2018). In their simplest form, power-based theories assert that differences in power affect cooperation's level, rules, and incentives. For foreign policy professionals, studies of powerful riparian nations retaining their privileged shares of transboundary waters often emphasize the importance of relative advantages and security considerations that are at the heart of power-based theories (see Nwafor 2018: 223). Interest-based

theories state that when foreign policy officials encounter obstacles to collective action, they work together to avoid less-than-ideal results. In these instances, they behave rationally to maximize their utility. Institutions that are well-designed (for example, those that protect the ozone layer; see Nwafor 2018) can benefit both nations and alter their motivations to exploit the environment. Which level of cooperation is optimal depends on how well each instrument balances its respective shortcomings; multilateralism can lower transaction costs, but regionalism or bilateralism can stop exclusion or free-riding when it comes to a public good (Thompson and Verdier 2010). Finally, knowledge-based theories focus on the ways in which information shapes the identities and actions of foreign policy officials involved in environmental issues. It was found, for example, that powerful anti-whaling discourses influenced foreign policy-makers' positions toward the need to preserve whales and made the issue of whales a worldwide concern (Epstein 2008; Chizea and Oyekunle 2015).

In addition to explanations based on power, interest, and knowledge that account for states' participation in various forms of cooperation, the extensive literature on international environmental regimes has mainly relied on foreign policy analysis and international negotiation (see Chizea and Oyekunle 2015: 118). The explanation of the decision-making and negotiating processes employed by foreign policy officials while acting along the domestic–international border is facilitated by these methodologies, which allow the integration of ideational and material elements that impact state action. Conceptualizations of the role of bargaining power and the effectiveness of lead versus veto coalitions in determining the level of cooperation are two examples of this (Young 1997; Chasek et al. 2010). Regime compliance studies have further investigated the relationship between the domestic and international levels by examining governments' intentions and capacities when they decide whether and to what extent to implement international commitments domestically (Weiss and Jacobson 1998; Chayes and Chayes 1995). Though environmental regimes may have some degree of control over states, the literature generally acknowledges that these regimes are perceived as having been established by and for states. This reinforces the importance of the state-centered system in the functioning of the system on multiple levels (see also Bulkeley 2015: 878; Fashoyin, Ogunniyi, and Amah 2017: 352).

The Idea of Multilevel Governance: Common Capabilities as Entry Points:

Multilevel governance is a second analytical framework for environmental foreign policy. This approach starts with the idea that different governmental levels have overlapping abilities (Marks et al. 1996: 41). Multilevel governance refers to decision-making procedures that entail the concurrent mobilization of social movements and nongovernmental groups, as well as state agencies operating at several jurisdictional levels (Piattoni 2010). Despite being a controversial concept, its broad acceptance indicates a shared concern about the risks to state authority posed by emerging non-state actors, increased complexity, and expanding jurisdictions (Bache and Flinders 2004: 4–5). Those who decide on environmental foreign policy are among the actors who share policy responsibility. The terms "multilevel governance" have become widely used in numerous subfields of political science (Hooghe and Marks, 2003; Zürn et al., 2010). Studies of the European Union, international relations, political economics, federalism and public policy, comparative politics, and normative political theory are some of these subfields.

The Baltic Sea fisheries provide an example of commons governance that incorporates several regulatory procedures functioning at various scales, so illuminating the workings of multilevel governance (Burns and Stöhr 2011). The EU Common Fisheries Policy serves as the basis for this governance structure, and decisions about rules pertaining to the Baltic Sea are discussed among EU member states' ministers. The EU Council of Ministers, which is the highest decision-making body deciding on broad policy measures to be implemented by the fishery ministries of member states, receives rules prepared and proposed by the European Commission, also known as the Directorate-General for Maritime Affairs and Fisheries. EU member states have a significant say in determining the annual total allowable catches, but they also have to deal with the Commission's considerable authority in establishing and overseeing institutional arrangements, a multilevel system of member states (including non-coastal states), and grassroots authority.

Water and climate are two other concerns that have been examined from a multilayer approach and operate across several geographical scales in their biological aspects (Moss and Newig 2010). Through case studies of the Aral Sea basin and the Danube, Euphrates, and Mekong River basins, Finger and colleagues (2006) described the politics of transnational water resource management as a multi-governance effort to collectively solve public problems by involving a variety of relevant actors, from the local to the global level, including institutions, states, civil society, and businesses. For example, Schreurs (2010) explained how cities and provinces in China, Japan, and South Korea start their own climate action plans and join local, national, and international networks for climate change. He also argued that national, regional, and local governments have both distinct and complementary roles in developing strategies for climate mitigation and adaptation.

Furthermore, multilevel governance approaches have been used extensively in regulatory process analysis to help evaluate the effectiveness of human solutions to environmental issues and to present a comprehensive view of human responses. Studies using such approaches have led to a number of analytical discussions regarding the "right" scale for solving an issue, the centralization of decision-making at different levels, the interaction between various aspects of governance, and the shift from institution-focused to institutional complex-focused thinking. The following is a brief summary of these debates:

Scales and Subsidiarity. One of the key problems with multilevel governance is determining which responsibilities should be "scaled" to what level of authority. The EU has been experimenting with the idea of regulating authority for decades, using the principle of subsidiarity, which states that action should be taken at the lowest effective level of governance and that tasks should remain at lower levels unless moving them to a higher level would ensure greater comparative effectiveness (Jordan 2000). It is believed that the effectiveness of institutions for collective action depends on how well their political-administrative features match the features of the bio-geophysical systems they interact with, even though there is no one-size-fits-all approach to matching tasks and levels in the international arena (Young 2002). Nevertheless, environmental challenges are constantly generated, built, controlled, and fought across, across, and among scales (Delaney and Leitner 1997; Gupta 2008; Bulkeley 2015: 876), even while there may be an ideal level for handling a problem from a functional standpoint. After

discussions over the appropriate definition, the following governance structure was reached: Is controlling the number of children a matter for the home or the environment at large? Is the Amazon a local resource or a global one, the world's lungs? Is the management of whales a worldwide matter where non-whaling nations have a say, or is whaling a regional issue for whaling countries? Which group of people is more responsible for supporting climate change adaptation: the impacted populations locally or the major historical polluters on a worldwide scale?

Monocentric vs. Polycentric Governance. The dichotomy between monocentric and polycentric governance has been debated in local governance disputes and, more recently, in the context of global governance (Ostrom et al., 1961; Ostrom, 2009). A monocentric hierarchy is one in which lower level entities obey the choices made by upper level political bodies. The presence of a national central government facilitates the use of such a command-based strategy. In this context, however, monocentricity refers to top-level rulemaking through global regimes, where international negotiators find global solutions through multilateral negotiations (e.g., how to protect the ozone layer), and lower levels of government carry out mandates. This is because there is no world government at the international level. The term "polycentric governance" refers to a system of many formal autonomous centers of decision-making that interact, collaborate, compete, and share knowledge. It is often addressed in contexts where there is either no international rule-making at all, in which case the emphasis is on other levels (forest governance, for example), or when multilateral rule-making is at a standstill, in which case players often look for alternative arenas for political involvement (e.g., climate change). The next discussion centers on how big of interventions are required and how to combine top-down and bottom-up strategies (Howlett and Rayner 2011; Tal and Cohen 2007; Yinusa 2019).

Interplay and Institutional/Regime Complexity. Researchers studying multilevel governance have gone beyond concerns about the hub of decision-making to look more closely at the relationships between governance arrangements, distinguishing between horizontal and vertical interactions to show the relationships between various institutional arrangements at the same level of social organization as well as the relationships between levels (see Young 2002). Concerns regarding their influence on governance have been raised by the fact that the number of links has increased along with the number of institutions and that the governance activities of various institutional arrangements overlap in ways that are either complementary or conflicting (ozone vs. climate regime, for example) or both (biodiversity and climate regime, for example) (also see Najam et al. 2006; Kanie and Haas 2010; Yinusa 2019). Recent studies (Oberthür and Gehring 2006; Selin 2010; Oberthür and Stokke 2011) have looked at the roles that actors play in controlling institutional interaction as well as the causal mechanisms that institutional linkages use to impact the effectiveness of multilevel governance efforts. As a result of paying more attention to institutional interactions, some academics have altered their focus from studying individual institutions to examining sets of institutions that simultaneously influence an issue area. Raustiala and Victor (2004), for instance, developed the term "regime complex" to describe groups of specialized sectoral and issue-based regimes as well as other governing systems that are tangentially related to one another, sometimes overlapping and at odds with one another. Similar to this, Oberthür and Stokke (2011) discuss "institutional complexes," while Biermann and

colleagues (2009) use "architectures" for global governance. Concerns about issues reflecting the expansion of the international system, such as growing complexity, multiplying jurisdictions, overlapping, parallel, and nested agreements, have given rise to debates on networked politics in broader international relations scholarship (Kahler 2009; Collier and Aboaba 2020).

The impact of growing complexity on the formulation of policies is a topic of continuous discussion. Others demonstrate that institutional divisions of labor are more stable than expected and that opportunistic behavior is significantly constrained (Oberthür and Stokke 2011; Papa 2021). Some argue that complexity encourages opportunistic behavior by states and weakens institutions (Alter and Meunier 2009). This discussion shows how, when shared competences provide the foundation for environmental foreign policy research, the analytical focus moves from achieving state objectives at all levels to addressing environmental concerns through multilevel governance. This point of view identifies the factors that lead to institutional success or failure, helps map other significant players, and situates foreign policy decision-makers within the greater framework of attempts to solve the issue. Foreign policy professionals have more opportunity to advance their chosen policy agendas while negotiating and brokering accords at various scales due to the increasing complexity of government. But a lot of processes (including non-state ones like private regulation) happen "away from the negotiating table," which means they shape circumstances in ways that may not be optimal for attaining intended foreign policy objectives (see also Lax and Sebenius 2006). The boundaries within which states operate are being redefined as they mediate among many levels and constituencies of environmental regulation, as findings from this and the state-centric approach demonstrate.

The Politics of Foreign Policy-Making at the Crossovers:

The conventional practice of foreign policy is being called into question by changes in the political power of the state and the increasing intricacy of the international system. Decision-makers in environmental foreign policy must weigh conflicting demands and claims, decide when and how to act, what impact their actions will have, and to what extent and to whom they will be accountable (Hill 2003: 284). Making foreign policy at the intersections of various governmental levels brings to light a number of political difficulties, including whether to pursue issue rescaling, how to choose institutions and determine which ones are pertinent, how to handle transscalar civil society, and how to address equity concerns brought on by the system's expansion.

Issue Definitions are Unstable: Rescaling as a Political Pursuit:

Decision-makers in charge of foreign policy must be able to agree on the nature of the issue they are tackling in order to benefit from international collaboration. Decision-makers may have a preferred issue-framing strategy when they negotiate, which indicates the degree of authority and accountability they are willing to take on. While advancing one's own agenda and defining problems has historically been a hallmark of clever foreign policy, issues may now be carried to numerous forums by various players and (re)defined through political contestation due to the growing complexity of governance. In order to influence policy-making in ways that suit their objectives, foreign policy officials can act strategically and scale up or down problems, but they also need to be aware of comparable attempts being made by other players and take appropriate action to thwart them (Gupta 2008). Rescaling

happens at any point during the process of international collaboration, both as a practical attempt to find better answers to challenges involving collective action and as a result of self-serving opportunism (Modupeola 2012; Spector and Zartman 2013).

Institutional Loyalty Is Not Assumable: Issues with Institutional Relevance and Choice:

Decision-makers in charge of foreign policy have often focused on organizations that would serve as hubs for nations within the international system, allowing states to coordinate their expectations and bargaining power with one another (Schelling 1960). However, when institutions get more densely packed together, new issues emerge against a backdrop of established, perhaps pertinent ones, and more institutions may manage older issues at the same time (Jupille and Snidal 2006). Consequently, selecting a course of action from a variety of institutional options and making an assessment of institutional significance become more difficult.

Researchers have shown that while environmental institutions have been the main focus of most environmental foreign policy-making, they are not necessarily the most important in influencing human behavior that results in environmental change (Underdal 2008). Given the common formula for the aggregate impact of human activities on the environment (i.e., impact = population × affluence × technology), the World Trade Organization (WTO), the European Union (EU), and transnational religious and cultural communities are likely to be the institutional arrangements most important to the environment. Major economic activity, technical advancement, and societal belief, value, and practice systems are all likely significantly impacted by these groups (Underdal 2008; Ehrlich and Holdren 1971; Oputa 2016). Participating in these institutions, however, raises additional issues. For instance, when environmental disputes are brought to the WTO's dispute resolution body, it is questioned if the organization is the right forum and has the necessary resources to handle them. Additional instances comprise legal challenges against the European Union's ban on the importation of genetically modified food and crops, as well as the legitimacy of Chinese government support for the "green economy" and subsidies given to its wind power producers (Lieberman and Gray 2008).

Dealing with Transscalar Civil Society:

Today's global, regional, national, provincial, and municipal social regulations connect and span many domains, giving civil society more access and power to shape governmental agendas (Scholte 2010). This adds to the unpredictability of foreign policy-making because, as various branches of government (federal, state, and local, for example) pursue distinct agendas, the line separating domestic and foreign policy can quickly blur and lead to inconsistent responses from the government (Oputa 2016: 321). For example, Alcañiz and Gutiérrez (2009) showed how civil society might incite a minor conflict to grow and spread over many regional and international fora regarding the planned construction of two pulp factories on the Uruguay River, which Uruguay and Argentina share. In the conflict over the preservation of old-growth forests in Clayoquot Sound, Canada, Pralle (2006) provided evidence of how various political actors, including local and national civil society, timber companies, and various levels of government, formed and reorganized alliances and enlisted the aid of various governmental institutions in order to further their objectives.

Civil society presence in several rule-making locations may also hold foreign policy officials more responsible by exposing instances in which they participate in symbolic politics instead of really advancing environmental problem-solving. Foreign policy officials have the intellectual responsibility of justifying their judgments since nations operate in a global information arena and want to be seen as supportive of environmental ideals (Chong 2007: 197). When governments pursue their environmental foreign policy in many forums, inconsistencies frequently occur. In the whaling regime, the United States promotes the precautionary principle, while undermining it in the climate regime. China says that because the Security Council does not have universal participation, it is not the right platform to handle climate change, but it then tries to reduce the number of parties involved. The "civilizing force of hypocrisy" can ideally be unleashed by such discrepancies, since civil society can raise objections to them. They can persuade nations to formulate their objectives and views using the language of reason through the public realm, so validating and replicating norms (Elster 1998; Risse 2000; Oputa 2016). Although civil society has been very active in environmental politics and has pioneered new ways of working with states and on their behalf in decision-making, it is still unclear how civil society will influence foreign policy-making in the complex context of international relations. In what circumstances does civil society back governmental initiatives to reframe problems, reorient cooperative efforts, or transfer to non-environmental institutions?

Towards More Power Politics and Less Democracy?

Environmental diplomacy has made a lot of noise about issues of justice and equality, especially in relation to the common but differentiated responsibility standard (Okubo 2017; Ekeh 2019: 322-323). The increasing complexity of environmental governance highlights two additional equity challenges. One is that, even if there are many levels involved in policy negotiation in this setting, elected politicians do not have the last say in the matter, and there may be a lack of democratic legitimacy and transparency. Therefore, multilevel governance's very nature conflicts with the standards of democratic legitimacy that are in place today (Jordan 2000). The other concern is that the proliferation of international agreements at all levels may eventually weaken legal obligations, undermine the legitimacy of international law, and possibly even strengthen rather than weaken great powers as a result of normative fragmentation (ILC 2006; Drezner 2009). To negotiate through several, intricate layers of government and to create the best foreign policy plans, nations must possess a strong analytical foundation. This provides more resource-rich nations with an advantage. For instance, Pistorius (1995) examined discussions about plant genetic resources in three international arenas and discovered that developing nations were disadvantaged by issue linkages between these arenas because they were unable to control spillovers in a way that would benefit them (Ekeh 2019).

Selecting the best course of action and refining it over time are the two main goals of environmental foreign policymaking. The menu of options expands and brings to light the subject of the relative importance of different channels of collaboration when decision-makers act at the intersections of numerous negotiation processes. Simultaneously, transscalar civil society may be more visible to foreign policy decision-makers, increasing the challenge for civil society to maximize its impact in a variety of arenas. An increased understanding of equity issues highlights the significance

of investigating whether environmental foreign policy might contribute to the development of a more sustainable international system.

Insider Perspectives on Environmental Diplomacy:

There are not many empirical studies that are based on seeing discussions in person. Studies often result in a chronological list of conferences, their principal conclusions, and a selection of noteworthy actions by specific nations, such Canada's announcement of its departure from the Kyoto Protocol, which made headlines. The dynamics that occur at the negotiating table are frequently unknown. What is the verbal communication between the delegations? What are the informal consultations' bargaining offers and responses? Relevant research mostly steers clear of these issues and instead focuses on related subjects like future policy alternatives (Victor 2011) or conceptualizing the formation and effects of institutions (Barrett 2013; Young 1994). This inclination seems sense and could even be inescapable. One of the biggest barriers to studying diplomacy is the absence of direct access to conversations. Very few academics go to UN meetings or interview important players in-depth. The majority of negotiations take place in "working group" meetings and unofficial consultations, which are accessible to even fewer people.

Engaged in environmental diplomacy, individuals provide rich empirical accounts. Readers can get as close to reality as possible through participatory observations, which are presented in works such as Richard Benedick's 1998 classic story of ozone diplomacy, David Humphreys's tireless efforts documenting forest policy negotiations, and insiders' perspectives on climate negotiations (Depledge 2005b; Dimitrov 2010). Detailed accounts of negotiations offer an insider's view and are based on interviews with key players (Falkner 2000) or direct author involvement (Benedick 1998; Bodansky 2020; Depledge 2005a, 2005b, 2006; Dimitrov 2015, 2010; Kulovesi and Gutiérrez 2019; Akinwale 2019; Rajamani 2020, 2022; Smith 2020). Richly experienced negotiating contributors to the *Earth Negotiation Bulletin* continue to be an invaluable source of information on various conferences (Chasek and Wagner 2012; Jinnah et al. 2009; Wagner 2007). These and other publications offer a tactile experience of environmental diplomacy and comprehensive information that might inform theory and practice. A book from the front lines of environmental diplomacy is written by American diplomat Richard Smith (2009), who assisted in the negotiation of many accords. This seasoned professional sheds light on aspects of environmental diplomacy that are sometimes overlooked by academic researchers: genuine discussions occur in unofficial working groups rather than formal plenary sessions; breakthroughs happen during all-night sessions during conference final days; and nation delegations occasionally choose to remain silent as a negotiating strategy.

Academic Perspectives:

Research on diplomacy frequently aims to clarify specific national stances or the results of group negotiations. Detlef Sprinz and Tapani Vaahtoranta (1994) emphasized domestic cost-benefit analysis in a classic research, explaining national stances in talks with respect to predicted policy costs and ecological sensitivity. The question of why some talks result in policy agreements while others do not was also explored in early studies. In one experiment, five empirical episodes of effective regime building were compared in an effort to determine the factors that contribute to success (Young and

Osherenko 1993). The authors came to the conclusion that none of the independent factors they had looked at could account for the results. Later research lowered expectations and stopped attempting to provide comprehensive theoretical justifications for the results of negotiations.

Game Theory:

Game theory is concerned with simulating negotiations and uses formal reasoning to determine expected outcomes given fixed player preferences. Bruce de Mesquita (2009) asserted confidently that it is possible to forecast the future. Based on computer models, he projected that global climate policy will gradually degrade between 2050 and 2100, having gained momentum for a few decades before failing at the 2009 Copenhagen conference. More conventionally, game theory has been used by Scott Barrett (1998, 2003) to describe the obstacles to international environmental cooperation. Hugh Ward is another trailblazer in this field; in 1993, he utilized the game of chicken to shed light on climate talks and went on to create a model of climate negotiations that included varying country stances on the dragger and pusher countries (Ward et al. 2001).

Formal models of bargaining have rarely been used to environmental negotiations in the real world (Avenhaus and Zartman 2007). In a series of studies (Carraro 1997) that speculated on potential agreements on the reduction of greenhouse emissions using expanded game theoretic approaches, heterogeneity of state actors was hypothesized to improve the possibilities for burden sharing arrangements and coalition formation. The veracity of this claim is questionable as research has not compared formal models with actual discussions. An integrative bargaining model developed by Oran Young (1994) considers a number of factors, including the involvement of several parties, the haziness around prospective costs and benefits, and shifting interest configurations. His model is commonly recognized as influential in the discipline but has yet to be applied systematically in empirical studies.

Power and Leadership:

According to Deborah Davenport's 2005 analysis, the US's preferences account for the collapse of talks toward a worldwide forest treaty. Nonetheless, the majority of experts on international environmental politics concur that hegemonic power has minimal bearing on environmental diplomacy (Falkner 2005; Andresen and Agrawala 2002; Young 1991; Underdal 1994). Robert Falkner (2005) presents a comprehensive analysis of the subject and demonstrates that hegemony is an inadequate framework that does not explain US policy trajectory or global effects. Furthermore, little nations can still have a big say in discussions. The Netherlands has influenced both European and international climate discussions via initiative and astute diplomacy (Kanie 2003). According to Betzold (2010), the Alliance of Small Island States actively participates in climate negotiations and has an impact on the outcome by "borrowing external power."

A thriving corpus of study on leadership has resulted from structural power's limited relevance. According to Gupta and Grubb (2000), there are three main categories of leadership: instrumental, directive, and structural. Material resources, such as the amount of forest cover in Brazil or the proportion of harmful emissions in China, are the source of structural leadership. Leaders with a directional approach, like the European Union (EU) in climate change or the United States in ozone discussions, provide an example for other nations with their unilateral internal policies that show them

how to solve problems. (Underdal 1994). Political initiative, tact, and inventiveness are necessary for instrumental leadership throughout the negotiating process, which includes making strong policy recommendations and arguments. Young (1991) presents a different typology that identifies three categories of leadership: intellectual, entrepreneurial, and structural.

There are two subcategories of instrumental leadership: intellectual and entrepreneurial (Young 1991; Kanie 2003). A prime example of an enterprising leader is the tiny island nation of Tuvalu, whose delegation has contributed tangible ideas to climate talks, such as a comprehensive treaty draft that was submitted in 2009 ahead of Copenhagen. Early in the negotiating process, intellectual leadership is very crucial (Andresen and Agrawala 2002). By bringing up the concept of carbon trading during the Kyoto Protocol discussions, the United States demonstrated its intellectual leadership in the 1990s.

How can we identify a leader? It is a significant step forward to critically examine the process of identifying leaders, as political declarations of leadership are frequently made and oftentimes false—Canada's politicians even profess to be leaders in climate policy! Innovative recent research looks on the demand side of leadership. According to diplomats interviewed for the climate negotiations, peers most frequently consider China and the EU as leaders (Kilian and Elgström 2010; Karlsson et al. 2011). Other research investigates the causal factors that give rise to leaders; a typical case study in this regard is European leadership.

In environmental talks on a range of topics, the EU has demonstrated a strong leadership role (Gupta and Grubb 2000; Vogler 2005; Harris 2007; Schreurs and Tiberghien 2007; Oberthür and Kelly 2008). According to some academics (Manners 2012; Krämer 2014; Erinosho 2020), Europe's standards and identity as an ideational leader are what gave rise to this position. Upon further examining institutionalist assumptions, Vogler (2005) discovers evidence of "normative entrapment": European leadership stems from a normative position on climate change and continues to be a component of a persistent self-image that drives robust policies. Others warn against idealism, arguing that the EU is driven by political economics and material reasons (Falkner 2007).

By contrasting four different theories, Jon Hovi and colleagues (2003) contend that the EU's continued participation in the climate regime is the result of both institutional inertia at home and a desire for worldwide leadership driven by power. When it withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol in 2001, the United States gave the European Union and other players an opportunity to gain political power in one of the most important current discussions. In a similar vein, Schreurs and Tiberghien (2007) focus on domestic institutions and argue that leadership is explained by "multilevel reinforcement" and power contests between significant EU member states, the European Commission, and Parliament. Norichika Kanie (2003) provides us a thorough empirical examination of the Netherlands' participation in climate negotiations while diving even further into domestic politics. He demonstrates how strong collaboration between the government delegation and Dutch NGOs during international conferences, as well as internal political processes, enabled Dutch leadership.

Domestic–International Connections:

Another profitable field of research is the interaction between national politics and global debates (see Popoola and Adams 2017). Each delegation in negotiations engages in two simultaneous "games"

with local constituents and international counterparts, as established by Robert Putnam's groundbreaking research from 1988. Scholars are still able to explain state behavior with the help of his notion of the two-level game (Agrawala and Andresen 2001). Beth DeSombre (2000) sheds light on negotiations by exposing the home origins of international environmental policy in her highly acclaimed study. Áslaug Ásgeirsdóttir (2008) looks at negotiations over fish stocks between Iceland and Norway and supports Putnam's theory that strong domestic interest groups help states negotiate more favorably with neighboring nations. Due to pressure from Iceland's robust fishing sector, the government was able to extract concessions from Norway, whose domestic forces were weaker and so gave the delegation more room to maneuver and be more willing to compromise. Further empirical research challenges the idea by indicating that state leaders could decide to pursue international tactics without closely monitoring the home game and may opt to disregard domestic restrictions. McLean and Stone (2012) contend, in a study of the Kyoto Protocol, that the EU, independent of the results of negotiations, has a philosophical commitment to climate cooperation and lowers its domestic politics to the international level.

Issue Linkage:

It is unusual for policy debates on other ecological concerns to occur in isolation from negotiations on a particular environmental challenge. State and nonstate actors intentionally connect climate change, forestry, desertification, ozone depletion, biodiversity, and other challenges in order to influence policy results. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) conferences have been overrun by these tactics, turning climate politics into a focal point of international environmental politics (see below). As Sikina Jinnah points out, "it seems that everyone from McDonald's to the Vatican is jumping on the proverbial climate change bandwagon," with over 1,200 NGO and IGO observers now accredited to attend the UNFCCC negotiations, representing over 22 issue areas and drawing over 20,000 observers (Jinnah 2011: 2).

Drawing from the body of research on institutional interplay (Young, 2002), studies have added to our knowledge of the effects of problem linkage while also provoking discussion. Making connections between commerce and environmental concerns facilitated ozone depletion discussions and helped the Montreal Protocol succeed (Barrett 2013). Joining the bandwagon might lead to more successful climate change policy results (Jinnah 2011). In addition, links exacerbate the already overwhelming complexity of issues in climate politics and obstruct fruitful discussions (Wapner 2011; Victor 2011).

Nonstate Actors:

State delegations are the primary players in environmental diplomacy, however nonstate actors can attend conferences and have an impact on the proceedings (see Akinbobola 2018: 284). More than 20,000 NGO representatives attended the 2009 climate change mega-conference in Copenhagen, accounting for half of all registrations. According to Kal Raustiala's (2002) comprehensive list of NGO influence techniques, governments and NGOs have a symbiotic connection. An influential analytical approach was created by Betsill and Corell (2001) to comprehensively examine the function of environmental NGOs and civil society. Using this approach, Humphreys (2004) found that green non-

governmental organizations (NGOs) may impact forest negotiations by participating early in the process and framing their policy suggestions in a manner consistent with neoliberal language.

NGOs actively work to influence climate change talks through coalition building, awareness raising, "corridor politics," and participation on state delegations, while it is unclear how much of an actual impact they have on policies (Gulbrandsen and Andresen 2014; Opeifa 2019). In recent years, civil society has been marginalized in environmental conferences (Fisher 2010). Researchers also examine the influence of corporate and industry groups on environmental discourse (Levy and Egan 2003; Mecking 2011; Vormedal 2009). Corporate actors seldom succeed in blocking international regulation, but they can influence the parameters of agreements to support market-based instruments for policy, such as carbon trading (Mecking 2011).

Norms, Discourse, and Argumentation in Negotations:

International environmental policy is influenced by shared global norms, according to constructivist academics (see Momoh 2020: 321-322). The precautionary concept was favored in societal discourse that gave rise to the ozone conventions (Litfin 1994). Forest diplomacy, the establishment of the powerless UN Forum on Forests, and state engagement across the board are all explained by a worldwide norm of environmental multilateralism (Dimitrov 2015; Abubakar 2019). Furthermore, the results of the Earth Summit in 1991 are consistent with a liberal environmentalist normative framework (Bernstein 2001).

One significant gap in the literature is the almost total lack of research on diplomatic arguments. Comprehensive evaluations of the literature reveal that the issue of argument exchange has received the least amount of attention in this area of study (Jönsson 2002; Zartman 2002). Even though it is well acknowledged that "international negotiation is essentially communication" (Stein 1988: 222), communication is still uncharted territory in the field of negotiation studies. In reality, what do delegates say to each other? Jönsson claims that "the dynamics of mutual persuasion attempts that we usually associate with negotiations—the back-and-forth communication—are insufficiently caught" (Jönsson 2002: 224). This is regrettable, particularly in light of recent research showing that the communication of policy preferences significantly affects the likelihood of agreement, regardless of distributional concerns or worries about cheating (Earnest 2008).

Both Harald Müller (2004) and Thomas Risse (2000) made strong cases for the necessity to research communicative behavior, but the scant research on the subject has yielded conflicting findings, in part because there are not many verbatim recordings of negotiations (Deitelhoff and Müller 2005). Scholars seldom get access to international talks, particularly when they are held in private. Prominent studies by Joanna Depledge and Farhana Yamin tackle the pervasive disrespect for protocol and provide in-depth descriptions of the procedural arrangements of climate negotiations, but they leave out the political negotiations between delegations (Depledge 2005b; Yamin and Depledge 2004). Christian Grobe (2010) put out a rationalist theory of argumentative persuasion in a recent study, arguing that shifts in negotiation stances are not caused by arguments but rather by new causal information about the matter at hand. Notably, his "functional persuasion theory" does not incorporate any information on the discussions between conference delegates and instead relies on secondary sources.

There is now proof that conversation and persuasion may change policy choices. A new research (Dimitrov 2015) analyzes persuasive strategies used in climate diplomacy and examines the microdynamics of international interactions. Numerous conclusions are drawn from this study. Initially, governments make significant attempts to influence others and participate in intentional communication with the goal of changing policy preferences in other nations. In other words, actors try to influence one another's thoughts rather than just following policy. Governments employ several forms of arguments, including procedural, legal, moral, pragmatic, and ideological arguments. Thirdly, certain methods of persuasion are more effective than others. The interests of other nations are the focal point of persuasive reasoning. Astute negotiators craft their own arguments to suit the needs of the people they hope to convince (Dimitrov 2015).

Climate Change Negotiations:

Discussions about the global climate are distinctive and attract a lot of interest from both the academic and general audience (Salako 2017). Daniel Bodansky, Joanna Depledge, and others have spent decades documenting diplomatic efforts to create a global response to climate change during the last 20 years (Bodansky 2004, 2020; Depledge 2005a, 2005b, 2006). Several participants in UN climate conferences have provided insight into the most recent debates over post-Kyoto policies. First-hand accounts (Fry 2008; Chandani 2010; Depledge 2006; Dimitrov 2015; Kulovesi and Gutiérrez 2019; Oberthür 2011; Rajamani 2020, 2022; Sterk et al. 2010) provide thorough and detailed summaries of the issues at hand, the positions of key countries, political dynamics, and significant decision outcomes. These accounts contribute to our understanding of the incredibly complex world of climate politics. Many academic publications review the climate accords that are in place and discuss possible directions for future cooperation (Clémençon 2008; Watanabe et al. 2008; Ott et al. 2008; Yamin and Depledge 2004; Victor 2001). Some focus on the positions taken by parties such as the USA (Depledge 2005a), China (Harris and Yu 2005), the EU (Oberthür and Kelly 2008; Vogler and Bretherton 2006; Hovi et al. 2003), developing countries (Najam et al. 2003), island states (Betzold 2010), and China (Harris and Yu 2005). Finally, a sizable corpus of research also examines issues of justice and equity, examines possible courses of action, and suggests courses of action (Müller 2011; Hare et al., 2010; Agrawala and Andresen 2001; Bodansky 2004; Adger et al. 2006; Harris 2021; Roberts and Parks 2007).

In December 2011, at Durban, after twenty rounds of official discussions spanning four years, global climate diplomacy took a serious hit. After two weeks of deliberations, ministers engaged in nonstop round-the-clock negotiations for three days. States ultimately agreed to delay a global climate deal for a minimum of nine years. This result was considered a disaster by many. Island nations referred to the decision as "harakiri," saying it "puts entire nations on death row," and the EU informally discussed boycotting the meeting (Akehaust and Akpan 2016). Australia, Canada, and the United States were the only three nations to publicly embrace this result; other nations did so in exchange for the Kyoto Protocol's continued implementation. A second commitment period was added to the Kyoto Protocol, extending it until 2025 or 2028 (to be determined). Notably, "Kyoto 2" depends on locally defined, voluntary national pledges. It just "invites countries" to report on their policy objectives. As a

result, the original Kyoto Protocol, which required countries to reduce their emissions to zero, was replaced with voluntary targets without even requiring them to be announced globally.

The global talks have been put on hold today, and there is little chance of progress in the next years. The result seems to follow the "law of the least ambitious program" established by Arild Underdal, which is still widely accepted in academic circles. Negotiations involving several players typically result in outcomes that represent the lowest common denominator, according to Underdal (1980). The complexity of the actors (194 nations) makes it challenging to reach meaningful climate accords. Because it gives each player veto power, the necessity of worldwide political consensus as a basis for decision-making raises significant barriers to successful multilateralism.

There is a notable agreement among academics over the lackluster future of climate diplomacy. According to David Victor (2006) and Bruce Bueno de Mesquita (2009), there is no doubt that the present global strategy will fail due to the extreme complexity of the issue and the wide range of country interests involved. Røgeberg, Andresen, and Holtsmark (2010) present data and graphs in a well-reasoned essay to demonstrate that the international community of nations is powerless to address the climate issue. Richard Smith (2020), a seasoned diplomat, views the climate negotiation process as a guide on how not to negotiate deals. As a crucial prerequisite for fruitful international discussions, he is concerned about the lack of domestic support and national policies in significant nations.

Academic analysts disagree on how to improve the prospects, even though they are pessimistic about them. A cottage industry of academics and think tanks has focused on a wide range of concepts for global climate policy (Aldy and Stavins 2010; Bodansky 2004). Robert Falkner and colleagues provide an alternative to a decentralized bottom-up approach: a "building blocks" strategy that gradually establishes a broad worldwide legal framework with legally enforceable pledges (Falkner et al. 2010). The exact opposite is suggested by David Victor (2011): having a small number of significant stakeholders form a nonbinding agreement on significant topics. In order to create global climate governance that reflects each nation's unique interests and capabilities, he proposes doing away with the legally binding paradigm of international law and establishing a global oligarchy of strong nations. Robyn Eckersley (2012) offers a mild variation of "inclusive minilateralism," which calls for a Global Climate Council made up of eight to twenty-three nations. In his constructivist advice on climate diplomacy, John Vogler (2010) urges governments to establish mutual knowledge of the issue and demonstrate their commitment through domestic policy measures.

Reevaluating Environmental Diplomacy's Role:

Although it is evident that the UN negotiations failed to achieve a climate treaty, commentators make diverse inferences from this development. Some suggest that the climate regime includes many institutions and voluntary activities, extending academic conceptions of regimes (Keohane and Victor 2011). Others concentrate on nonstate climate efforts and reject the international arena as useless (Hoffman 2011). Others, as Dimitrov (2015), uphold the value of diplomacy and establish a link between "failed" UN negotiations and advancements in multilevel climate governance by both state and nonstate actors.

While it is understandable to be frustrated that a treaty has not emerged from the climate talks, this does not have to sow distrust in international negotiations. The UN negotiations have been quite successful; even in the absence of a formal treaty, discussions have impacted state behavior and prompted the formulation of domestic policy (Dimitrov 2010, 2015). During the climate discussions, arguments from Europe influenced the views of many stakeholders regarding the economic benefits of climate legislation. International discussions in the 1990s were driven by the notion that enforcing climate policy is expensive and that countries have to choose between pursuing their environmental and economic objectives. The European Union introduced the concept of "win-win solutions" to the climate discussion in the early 2000s. They made a novel argument—that there is no contradiction between environmental and economic concerns and that climate policy may have beneficial economic effects—that at the time defied mainstream opinion. Many benefits accrue from cutting emissions: lower prices, increased economic competitiveness, improved energy security, more political independence from unstable regions such as the Middle East, improved public health, and a reduction in the catastrophic repercussions of climate change (Dimitrov 2015). Over the course of several years of discussion, the EU consistently made this argument. According to Vogler, who also confirms that the British government worked to change other countries' perceptions of the climate problem and their financial interests in mitigating it, emission reductions "are now claimed to constitute an economic benefit and a necessary investment, rather than a burden to be borne" (Vogler 2010: 2685–6). The European governments unilaterally agreed the ambitious and complicated 2007 "Energy and Climate Package," which is enforceable by all 27 member states, as proof that their words were being matched by actions (Morufu 2018; Obaseki 2018).

The "win-win" theory was accepted by several communities around the globe. Currently, there are significant domestic initiatives for clean energy and carbon reductions in 90 states, including the majority of large polluters. China's five-year plan (2011–15) is regarded by diplomats as the most advanced legislative framework in history for establishing a low-carbon economy. South Korea formally adopted the "Green Growth" paradigm of economic development in 2008, pledging to reduce emissions by 30% below business-as-usual by 2020. The country was influenced by European arguments regarding the financial advantages of green action, and it also established the Global Green Growth Institute to codify the theory. Norway intends to become carbon neutral by 2030 and reduced its emissions by 40% by 2020. It is also noteworthy that Japan has decided to reduce its emissions by 25% by the year 2025. Governments throughout the world are creating new departments devoted to climate policy, including Australia's Department of Climate Change and Energy.

Conclusion:

This paper examined environmental foreign policy from both a state-centric and a multilevel governance perspective in an effort to clarify the different ways that it operates at the intersections of multiple levels of governance and to enhance conceptual clarity in this context. Combining these two methods brings to light the difficulties faced by diplomats and foreign policy decision-makers in their capacities as intermediaries at the domestic–foreign border. Changes in the politics of foreign policy

decision-making are impacted by changes in political power and an increase in complexity at and among different administrative levels.

Despite a wealth of study on environmental governance, we still don't fully grasp how the increasing institutional complexity of foreign policy influences strategy and decision-making. Further empirical study in this field may change this. Future studies in these and other exciting fields might examine how major emerging powers—which are vying with one another to become global regulators—use different forms of environmental governance, how to revitalize multilateralism, an era-defining form of international environmental cooperation, and how environmental diplomacy and foreign policy can help define and guarantee environmental sustainability. Different levels of governance hold promise in that they allow governments to overcome the shortcomings of the international system and seize new opportunities for action. A greater emphasis on this project can help countries and international cooperation mechanisms develop into powerful tools for the political ingenuity needed to address environmental change on a global scale.

Since the 1990s, there has been a significant shift in global climate governance, and policy formation and implementation currently flourish in this area. Despite differences in approach, policy changes are all aimed toward the same goal: a low-carbon economy based on energy efficiency and renewable energy. Even if there are a lot of reasons for this Green Shift, it is impossible to separate the growing consensus over the past 20 years in worldwide debate about the importance of climate policy and the financial benefits of taking green actions. Though no treaty was signed as a consequence of this conversation, people's perceptions of national interests were impacted. According to Antto Vihma (2010), India's involvement in UN talks has altered the nation's internal climate discourse and decision-making procedures in a comprehensive empirical study. The expansion of global environmental norms, according to Peter Haas (2002), is a significant influence of UN environmental conferences. Despite its flaws, "the Kyoto Protocol" has become a household term in communities all around the world, raising climate change awareness.

Global discussions have benefited climate governance even though they have not succeeded in creating a new treaty. Beyond the process of drafting treaties, scholars studying negotiation should reconsider what constitutes a "result" and recognize the diverse ways in which negotiations affect the actions of states. International talks have caused state and business organizations to reevaluate their interests in green policy. Theoretical and practical developments in the field of persuasion and argumentation can be facilitated by additional study. It would make it possible for professionals and decision-makers to evaluate the efficacy of various negotiation strategies. Secondly, research on policy change and persuasion would contribute to the idea of interest creation. Argumentation studies may provide light on how discussions shape policy preferences and assist understand how interests are created, reconstituted, and changed in society.

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